Mitchell v. State Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 41882 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
12-5-2014
Mitchell v. State Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt.
41882
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Mitchell v. State Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 41882" (2014). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 5561.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/5561
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
RY AN M. MITCHELL, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
GERALD DURK SIMPSON, an individual, 
STATE OF IDAHO, a governmental entity and 
BANNOCK COUNTY, IDAHO, a political 
subdivision, SUSAN SIMPSON, as 
Conservator and Guardian of Gerald Durk 
Simpson, and DOES 1-25 
Defendant -Respondent. 
Supreme Court No. 41882 
District Court No. CV-2012-4124-OC 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT. 
HONORABLE ROBERT C. NAFTZ, DISTRICT JUDGE PRESIDING. 
William L. Mauk, ISB No. 1825 
Briane Nelson Mitchell, ISB No. 2346 
MAUK & BURGOYNE 
P.O. Box 1743 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1743 
Tel: (208) 345-2654 
Fax: (208) 345-3319 
Rebecca A. Rainey 
Fisher Rainey Hudson 
910 W. Main Street, Ste. 254 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Tel: (208) 345-7000 
Fax: (208) 297-2689 
Attorneys for Appellant/Plaintiff 
Thomas B. High, ISB No. 2430 
Bren E. Mollerup, ISB No. 7959 
BENOIT, ALEXANDER, HARWOOD & HIGH, LLP 
P.O. Box 366 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-0366 
Tel: (208) 733-5463 
Fax: (208) 734-1438 
Attorneys for Respondent/Defendant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES ............................................................. .iii 
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 1 
II. ARGUMENT .......................................................................................... 2 
A. The State has Failed to Present a Meritorious Argument that the Decision to Apply 
Discretionary Function Immunity was Correct ............................................... 2 
1. The State and the District Court incorrectly identified the precise conduct 
that forms the basis of Mitchell's claims against the State and, therefore, 
both erroneously applied the discretionary function immunity .............. .3 
11. The State did not move for summary judgment on the grounds that 
Mitchell could not meet a negligence standard and such argument cannot 
be considered for the first time on appeal ....................................... 8 
m. The Osborn and Chadwick affidavits should not have been considered in 
support of the State's motion for summary judgment ........................ 10 
B. The State has Failed to Present a Meritorious Argument that the District Court 
Correctly Refused to Allow a Private Right of Action to Enforce Mitchell's Rights as 
a Crime Victim .................................................................................. 12 
1. The prohibition against costs in the victims' rights laws mean only that 
costs cannot be awarded; they do not mean that no private rights of action 
exist ................................................................................. 13 
11. When a constitutional provision expressly states that it is self-enacting, it 
is ..................................................................................... 14 
m. The State's proposed interpretation ofldaho's victims' rights laws ignores 
traditional canons of statutory construction .................................... 15 
1v. The State did not move for summary judgment on the grounds that 
Mitchell is not entitled to notice involving Simpson's guardianship 
proceedings and such argument cannot be considered for the first time on 
appeal ............................................................................... 16 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - i 
III. CONCLUSION .................................................................................... 18 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - ii 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Baldner v. Bennett's, Inc., 
103 Idaho 458,649 P.2d 1214 (1982) ......................................................................................... 9 
Greer v. Lewiston Go(f & Country Club, Inc., 
81 Idaho 393,342 P.2d 719 (1959) ........................................................................................... 16 
Hurtado v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 
147 Idaho 813,215 P.3d 533 (2009) ......................................................................................... 12 
Idaho Department of Health v. South.fork Lumber Co., 
123 Idaho 146,845 P.2d 564 (1993) ......................................................................................... 13 
Idaho Schools.for Equal Educational Opportuinty v. Idaho State Bd Of Educ., 
128 Idaho 276,912 P.2d 694 (1996) ......................................................................................... 16 
In re. Univ. Place/Idaho Water Ctr. Project, 
146 Idaho 527, 199 P.3d 102 (2008) ......................................................................................... 13 
International Business Machines Corp. v. Lawhorn, 
106 Idaho 194, 677 P.2d 507 (Ct. App. 1984) .......................................................................... 17 
Jones v. City of St. Maries, 
111 Idaho 733, 727 P. 2d 1161 (1986) .................................................................................... 5, 6 
Lewis v. Estate of Smith, 
111 Idaho 755, 757, 727 P. 2d 1183, 1185 (1986) ...................................................................... 6 
Nycum v. Triangle Dairy Co., 
109 Idaho 858, 712 P.2d 559 (1985) ..................................................................................... 9, 17 
Perkins v. US. Transformer W, 
132 Idaho 427, 974 P.2d 73 (1999) ........................................................................................... 13 
Rees v. State Dept. of Health and Welfare, 
143 Idaho 10, 137 P.3d 397 (2006) ........................................................................................... 10 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - iii 
State ex. Rel. Lamm v. Nebraska Bd. Qf Pardons, 
260 Neb. 1000, 620 N.W.2d 763 (2001) ................................................................................... 14 
State v. Michael, 
111 Idaho 930, 729 P .2d 405 (1986) ......................................................................................... 16 
Sterling v. Bloom, 
111 Idaho 211, 723 P 2d. 755 (1986) .................................................................................. 3, 4, 5 
Tomich v. City of Pocatello, 
127 Idaho 394,398,901 P.2d 501,505 (1995) ........................................................................... 6 
Webster v. Potlatch Forests, 
68 Idaho 1, 187 P.2d 527 (1947) ................................................................................................. 9 
Statutes 
Idaho Code § 10-1201 ................................................................................................................... 15 
Idaho Code§ 10-1202 ............................................................................................................. 15, 18 
Idaho Code§ 10-1205 ................................................................................................................... 15 
Idaho Code§ 19-5306(4) .............................................................................................................. 13 
Idaho Code § 19-5309( 4) ............................................................................................................... 15 
Rules 
Idaho R. Evid. 801(d)(2) ............................................................................................................... 11 
Idaho R. Evid. 803(6) .................................................................................................................... 12 
Constitutional Provisions 
Idaho Const. Article 1, § 22 .............................................................................................. 13, 14, 15 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - iv 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Through its opposition briet the State attempts to direct this Court's attention away from 
the precise issues defined by Mitchell's appeal, reformulating the debate into matters that are not 
actually in issue and presenting arguments in support of theories the State failed to raise in the 
proceedings below. Accordingly, by way of introduction to the pivotal focus of this appeal, 
these misdirections warrant brief mention. 
First, the State has significantly modified the first issue presented on appeal ( Compare 
App. Br. at 4 and Resp. Br. at 3). In so doing, the State suggests that Mitchell seeks to impose a 
continuing duty on the State to monitor and control Simpson and other mental health patients 
after governmental services have been terminated. This is not accurate: it was not the subject of 
the proceedings below and is not the focus of this appeal. The focus of this appeal is whether 
the discretionary function immunity of Idaho Code, Section 6-904( 1) shields the State from 
liability when the precise nature of the plaintiff's claims is that the State was negligent ( even 
grossly negligent or reckless) by failing to follow its own directives and procedures. 
Second, the State attempts to argue that because Simpson shot Mitchell in the back 
Mitchell's core complaint is for aggravated battery and, thus, the State is immune from liability 
under another tort claim exception, Idaho Code Section 6-904(3). Not only is the State raising 
this alternative theory of immunity for the first time on appeal, its argument once agam 
misconstrues and misrepresents Mitchell's complaints against the State. Mitchell has never 
alleged that the State committed a battery against him, nor does he contend the State has some 
imputed liability for Simpson's intentional tort. Rather, Mitchell contends that the State was 
negligent ( even grossly negligent or reckless) by failing to follow its own directives and 
procedures. 
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Third, with respect to Idaho's victims' rights laws, the State is arguing-for the first time 
on appeal-that it was not required to provide any notification to Mitchell because the State was 
involved in guardianship proceedings, not criminal proceedings. That was not the basis of the 
State's motion or the district court's ruling on summary judgment, nor is it the focus of the 
present appeal. The present appeal seeks to determine only whether Idaho's victims' rights 
provisions allow for private enforcement through declaratory and injunctive relief, or if those 
promises to crime victims are to be read as mere suggestions that the State may disregard if it so 
desires. 
As addressed in Mitchell's opening brief: the precise issues before this Court relate to (i) 
the proper boundaries of discretionary function immunity and (ii) whether there are judicial 
enforcement mechanisms by which a victim can ensure that the rights guaranteed by Idaho's 
constitution and statutes are more than illusory. Because the State has failed to present adequate 
argument or persuasive authority supporting the summary judgment entered by the district court, 
Mitchell respectfully requests that this Court reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand 
this case for further proceedings. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. The State has Failed to Present a Meritorious Argument that the Decision to Apply 
Discretionary Function Immunity was Correct. 
This Court should reject the State's argument that discretionary function immunity 
applies because the State, in asking that the district court's decision be affirmed, relies on the 
district court's failure to accurately identify and address the precise nature of the conduct that 
forms the basis of Mitchell's complaint against the State. Because the district court was not 
considering the actual conduct when applying the planning/operations test adopted by this Court 
in Sterling v. Bloom it reached the incorrect result. The precise nature of the conduct about 
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which Mitchell complains is that the State failed to use due care in implementing the directives 
outlined in the Traughber Memorandum when making the decision to terminate Simpson's 
mental health services. As a result, Mitchell's complaints relate to operational functions and an 
ordinary negligence standard applies. Though the State did not move for summary judgment on 
the ordinary negligence standard, Mitchell has, nevertheless, demonstrated that genuine issues of 
material fact exist that should be considered by the trier of fact on remand. Moreover, because 
the evidence upon which the district court relied in reaching its conclusion that the decision to 
terminate Simpson's mental health services was a discretionary function was improperly 
admitted and impacted Simpson's substantial rights, this Court has an additional basis upon 
which to reverse the district court's decision. 
i. The State and the District Court incorrectly identified the precise conduct 
that forms the basis of Mitchell's claims against the State and, therefore, 
both erroneously applied the discretionary function immunity. 
The principal difference between the State and Mitchell's arguments regarding the 
application of discretionary function immunity is that the State, in its attempt to support the 
district court's decision, takes a very blunt approach to identifying the conduct that forms the 
basis of Mitchell's complaint. According to the State's argument, because the termination of 
Simpson's services was somehow related to budget cuts, discretionary function immunity 
applies. However, in order to properly apply the discretionary function analysis, a court must 
accurately identify the precise conduct that forms the basis of the plaintiffs claims, making sure 
to account for whether the precise conduct relates to planning functions or operational functions. 
Because the planning/operations test developed by this Court in Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 
211, 723 P.2d 755 (1986), and followed by a litany of cases that apply Sterling's 
planning/operations test all focus intently on accurately identifying the precise conduct that 
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forms the basis of the plaintiffs' claims, the blunt approach used by the district court and 
advanced by the State on this appeal should be rejected. 
In Sterling v. Bloom, this Court undertook a lengthy and studied analysis of discretionary 
function immunity. In explaining what conduct is immune and what is not, this Court began its 
analysis by emphasizing that the discretionary immunity statute contains two distinct clauses 
with very different orientations: 
The first clause in § 6-904(1) casts some light on the meaning of 
"discretionary" when it provides for immunity from claims arising 
out of governmental employees' actions "in reliance upon or the 
execution or performance of a statutory or regulatory function," 
but only where the governmental employees exercised "ordinary 
care." To execute or perform a statutory or regulatory function is 
to implement ( or make operational) the policy involved in statutory 
and regulatory functions. The fact that this clause is joined to the 
"discretionary function" clause with the disjunctive "or" 
demonstrates that the two clauses describe mutually exclusive 
conduct." [ citations omitted] Thus, the term "discretionary 
function" could not include the execution or performance ot: i.e., 
the implementation of, statutory or regulatory policy. Since 
discretionary functions involve actions qualitatively different from 
implementing policy, and since the former by definition involve 
the exercise of choice, judgment, and the ability to make 
responsible decisions, then discretionary functions must actually 
involve the formulation of policy. 
Id. at 227, 723 P.2d at 771. After clarifying the qualitative differences between discretionary and 
operational functions, the Sterling Court then detailed how the United States Supreme Court 
adheres to this planning/operational distinction in its application of discretionary function 
immunity under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), the text of which is 
indistinguishable from LC. § 6-904(1). 1 
In short, ... the United States Supreme Court ha[s] established that 
the discretionary function exception provide[s] immunity to (1) 
activities which involved the establishment of plans, specifications 
1 As Sterling explains, the federal version of the discretionary function exception only differs from the Idaho version 
by using the term "due care" rather than "ordinary care." 111 Idaho at 227, 723 P.2d at 771 n. 8. 
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and schedules where there is room for policy judgment and 
decision (generally referred to as planning activities), and (2) 
activities involving the implementations of statutory or regulatory 
policy (generally referred to as operational activities), so long as 
those activities are performed with due care. 
Id. at 229-30, 723 P.2d at 773-774 (emphasis original). 
Under this planning/operations test, Sterling explains that the focus of any reviewing 
court must be on correctly identifying the precise conduct alleged to have been negligent so it 
can determine whether that conduct is planning or operational. Id. at 230, 723 P.2d at 774. "If 
the [conduct is planning], the government is immune even where the planning was negligent; if 
the [conduct is operational], immunity is contingent upon the use of due or ordinary care." Id. 
The Sterling Court then adopts the federal analysis completely: 
[W]e hold that the planning/operation test as described above 
(including the discussion of judicial functions and of conduct in 
violation of policy) applies to the discretionary function exception 
of the Idaho Act, LC.§ 6-904(1). 
Id. at 232, 723 P.2d at 776. 
Immediately following Sterling, in Jones v. City of St. Maries, this Court re-emphasized 
with more brevity that there are two qualitatively different types of governmental functions: 
planning and implementing. 111 Idaho 733, 727 P. 2d 1161 (1986). If the conduct that forms 
the basis of the plaintiff's claims relates to developing a plan, the government is entitled to 
discretionary function immunity. 
The planning/operational test provides immunity for planning 
activities-activities which involve the establishment of plans, 
specifications and schedules where there is room for policy 
judgment and decisions. 
Id. at 735-736, 727 P.2d at 1163-1164. Conversely, if the conduct that forms the basis of the 
plaintiff's claim alleges negligent implementation of the plan, the conduct is operational and 
must be carried out with due care. 
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Operational activities-activities involving the implementation of 
statutory and regulatory policy-are not immunized and, 
accordingly, must be performed with ordinary care. 
Id. at 736,272 P.2d at 1164. Idaho law, as developed through Sterling and Jones, recognizes and 
acknowledges two qualitatively different aspects of government functions: (a) developing a plan 
and (b) putting the plan into place. 
In order to properly apply the planning/operations test, it is critical that a court first 
precisely identify the conduct that forms the basis of the plaintiffs complaint. In Tomich v. City 
of Pocatello, the precise conduct that was the subject of the plaintiffs complaints was that the 
City of Pocatello negligently maintained tie-downs at aviation facilities. 127 Idaho 394,398,901 
P .2d 501, 505 (1995). The City failed to show that it had made a policy decision to stop 
maintaining the tie-down facilities. Id. Because the challenged conduct related to implementing 
a duty that the City had undertaken-i.e., maintaining tie-downs-this Court held that the city 
was required to maintain those tie-downs in a non-negligent manner and discretionary function 
immunity did not apply. Id. 
Conversely, in Lewis v. Estate of Smith, the precise conduct that was the subject of the 
plaintiffs complaints was the infrequency with which the City of Blackfoot inspected fire 
hydrants. 111 Idaho 755,757,727 P. 2d 1183, 1185 (1986). According to the opinion, the 
challenged conduct was a budget-driven policy decision to cut back on the number of 
inspections. Id. This Court specifically noted that the plaintiff did not allege that the inspections 
themselves were negligently conducted. Id. Because the challenged conduct related to planning 
decisions, rather than how those decisions were implemented, this Court held discretionary 
function immunity applied. Id. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 6 
In this case, the precise conduct that is the subject of Mitchell's complaints against the 
State is that the State negligently implemented the directives outlined in the Traughber 
Memorandum when it made the decision to terminate Simpson's mental health services. Even if 
we acknowledge that budget cuts required the State to reduce mental health services, the policy 
outlined in the Traughber Memorandum is evidence that the State still undertook the duty to 
terminate individual mental health services in a way that reduced the risk of harm to patients and 
the community: "The purpose of this document is to describe the selection process of clients for 
closure and the steps that were taken in order to reduce the possibility of harm to clients and/or 
the community." R. 100. Because Mitchell's complaints against the State relate to the State's 
duty-as evidenced by the Traughber Memorandum-to reduce mental health services in a way 
that minimized the possibility of harm to clients and the community, this case is more like 
Tomich (were the allegations spoke to the negligent maintenance of tie-downs) than Lewis 
(where the allegations spoke to across the board reductions in number of inspections). 
Both the State and the district court improperly identified the conduct that is the subject 
of Mitchell's complaints as relating to the State's broad-based policy decision to reduce mental 
health services. Mitchell does not take issue with the State's claim that it had to make a broad-
based policy decision to reduce services.2 Rather, Mitchell specifically complains that when 
State actors implemented that broad-based policy decision in Simpson's specific case, they did 
not use due care and either intentionally or negligently failed to follow the directives outlined in 
the Traughber Memorandum. 
2 In an effort to divert this Court's attention away from the precise nature of Mitchell's claims, the State spends 
several pages of its opposition memorandum countering arguments that Mitchell has not made. To be clear, 
Mitchell does not take issue with the actual policies and procedures outlined in the Traughber Memorandum (see 
Resp. Br. at 6), nor does Mitchell contend that the State should have had a continuing duty or responsibility towards 
mental health patients to whom it was no longer providing services (see Resp. Br. at 11). Mitchell is not addressing 
these portions ofrespondents brief because they relate to matters that Mitchell did not raise on this appeal. 
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The State and the district court's blunt approach to identifying the conduct that forms the 
basis of Mitchell's complaint is not consistent with Idaho law, which requires that the conduct be 
precisely identified. Because the district court's decision incorrectly linked the termination of 
Simpson's mental health services to broad-based policy decisions rather than the negligent 
implementation of those policy decisions, it did not correctly identify the conduct complained of 
and, therefore, improperly applied discretionary function immunity. Accordingly, this Court 
should reverse the decision of the district court and remand with instructions to take evidence as 
to whether the State used due care in following the directives outlined in the Traughber 
Memorandum. 
ii. The State did not move for summary judgment on the grounds that Mitchell 
could not meet a negligence standard and such argument cannot be 
considered for the first time on appeal. 
After supporting his position that the district court erred in holding that discretionary 
function immunity applied, Mitchell's opening brief discussed the evidence creating genuine 
issues of material fact that should be considered when the correct negligence standard is applied. 
App. Br. 10-12. In that process, Mitchell discussed the absence of any facts showing that the 
State followed the Traughber Memorandum's directives when it conducted Simpson's specific 
case assessment. In response, the State claimed that Mitchell misunderstands his burden of proof 
on summary judgment, arguing that "Appellant is unable to cite to any evidence in the record 
showing the State acted negligently." Resp. Br. at 9. 
With this argument, the State asks this Court to affirm the district court's decision on yet 
another theory not raised by the State below: i.e., that there is no genuine issue of material fact 
regarding whether the State failed to exercise due care when implementing the Traughber 
Memorandum's directives to Simpson's case specific assessment. "This Court has repeatedly 
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upheld the well established principle that review on appeal is limited to those issues raised in the 
lower tribunal. With few exceptions, this Court will not address issues raised for the first time 
on appeal." Nycum v. Triangle Dairy Co., 109 Idaho 858,862, 712 P.2d 559,563 (1985) (citing 
Baldner v. Bennett's, Inc .. 103 Idaho 458,460,649 P.2d 1214, 1216 (1982); Webster v. Potlatch 
Forests, 68 Idaho 1, 16, 187 P.2d 527,536 (1947)). 
When the State moved for summary judgment on the grounds that it was entitled to 
discretionary function immunity, the State argued only that it's decision to terminate Simpson's 
mental health services was related to budget concerns and, therefore, was discretionary. 
R. 90-91. The district court, based exclusively on the claims that budget cuts caused a reduction 
in resources available for providing mental health services, held that discretionary function 
immunity applied. R. 483-84. Nowhere in its moving papers did the State present the 
alternative argument that, if the specific decision to cut Simpson's services were classified as an 
operational function, there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the State 
acted negligently. 
Had it presented this alternative argument, the State (not Mitchell), would have had the 
burden of proving no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the State acted negligently 
when it applied the Traughber Memorandum's directives to Simpson's specific case assessment. 
Nonetheless, Mitchell detailed the record evidence that establishes genuine issues of material 
fact for the trier of fact to consider on remand. 3 See App. Br. at 11-12. In its opposition, the 
State implies that the evidence cited by Mitchell should be construed in the light most favorable 
3 The State submitted a report in the Bingham County proceeding that stated that Simpson's "primary diagnosis is 
Paranoid Schizophrenic Psychotic Disorder ... [and that Simpson had] been unable to manage his medications 
without the assistance of case managers and/or his family throughout his adult life." R., 177. And, in its sworn 
answers to interrogatories, the State said that it provided services to Simpson until August 9, 2010 (R. 181 ), and that 
its services included ·'deliver[ing] medications to Simpson's home, observ[ing] him take medications ... (R. 182). 
The State also admitted that two of its employees, had observed Simpson walking with a gun, taken a picture of him 
with the gun, and then posted it where "other Adult Mental Health staff could have seen it." R. 183. 
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to the State. Resp. Br. at 9-10. This, of course, is not the correct standard. In reviewing the 
grant of a motion for summary judgment on questions of fact, this Court must construe the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party: Mitchell. Rees v. State Dept. of 
Health and We(fare, 143 Idaho 10, 20, 137 P.3d 397,407 (2006). 
To the extent that the State is asking this Court to affirm the district court's ruling on 
alternate grounds, such request is inappropriate because (i) the state did not raise those alternate 
grounds in the proceedings below and (ii) the evidence presented below, when viewed in the 
light most favorable to the non-moving party, creates a genuine issue of material fact regarding 
the State's negligence in failure to use due care when implementing the Traughber 
Memorandum's directives in Simpson's case specific assessment. For these reasons, this Court 
should reject the State's invitation to affirm the district court's decision on alternate grounds. 
iii. The Osborn and Chadwick affidavits should not have been considered in 
support of the State's motion for summary judgment. 
In his opening brief, Mitchell argues that the district court should not have relied on the 
Osborn and Chadwick affidavits because, as to Osborn, the affidavit was conclusory and not 
based upon personal knowledge and, as to Chadwick, because the affidavit does not meet an 
exception to the hearsay rule. The State did not take issue with any of the authority provided by 
Mitchell in support of these arguments and did not provide any authority to the contrary. Rather, 
the State asked this court to simply affirm the district court's ruling because (i) the admission of 
the evidence did not affect Mitchell's substantial rights and (ii) Mitchell relied on information 
contained in those affidavits and equity requires that the State be allowed to rely on the same 
information. Both of these arguments should be rejected. 
First, the suggestion that the improperly admitted evidence did not impact Mitchell's 
substantial rights altogether ignores the basis for the district court's grant of summary judgment. 
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The district court's decision is premised upon the sole and exclusive finding " .. .it appears that 
the primary reason for Mr. Simpson's termination was a result of budgetary constraints." R. 484. 
The evidentiary basis for this finding came exclusively from the insufficient affidavits: "The 
State argues it released Mr. Simpson based on budgetary constraints, and offers the affidavits of 
Jodi Osborn and Sue Chadwick in support of that argument." R. 483. Without the objectionable 
affidavits, there would have been no factual basis for the district court to conclude that the 
decision to terminate Simpson's services was a discretionary function. Accordingly, because the 
only evidence supporting the district court's grant of summary judgment was based upon 
insufficient affidavits, this Court should reject the State's argument that the erroneous admission 
of this evidence did not impact Mitchell's substantial rights. 
This Court should also reject the State's argument that if Mitchell can rely on exhibits 
improperly admitted through an affidavit that fails to lay an adequate foundation, then equity 
requires that the State also be allowed to rely on the same material. Resp. Br. at 13. Contrary to 
the State's unsupported argument, it is the rules of evidence, not principles of equity, that 
determine the admissibility of evidence. When an out of court statement is offered for the truth 
of the matter asserted, it cannot be admitted into evidence unless it is (a) not hearsay or (b) 
satisfies an exception to the hearsay rule. As is explained in footnote 3 of Mitchell's opening 
brief, Mitchell can rely on the Traughber Memorandum because it is an admission by a party 
opponent and, therefore, not hearsay. Idaho R. Evid. 801(d)(2). Because the State is not its own 
"party opponent," the State cannot rely on the same evidentiary rule to secure admission of 
documents drafted by its agents that contain hearsay. Rather, the State must satisfy an exception 
to the hearsay rule in order secure the admission of out of court statements offered by the State to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted. 
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As noted in Mitchell's opemng brief, in attempting to introduce the Traughber 
Memoranum (and other documents) through the Chadwick Affidavit the State did not satisfy the 
business records exception to the hearsay rule. The business records exception to the hearsay rule 
has very specific predicate components: (i) it must be a report or record, (ii) made at or near the 
time of the events recorded, (iii) made by a person with knowledge of those events at the time of 
the making of the record, (iv) kept in the ordinary course of business, and (v) that it was the 
regular practice of the business to keep that type of record. See Idaho R. Evid. 803( 6). 
Documents created "in anticipation of trial" do not satisfy the business records exception to the 
hearsay rule. Hurtado v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 147 Idaho 813, 815, 215 P.3d 533, 535 (2009). In 
this matter, the Chadwick affidavit attests to nothing more than that the documents attached as 
exhibits were "maintained" in the department's file. This recitation does not satisfy the predicate 
requirements of the business records exception to the hearsay rule. Accordingly, the district 
court improperly relied on this evidence. 
Because the insufficient affidavits upon which the State and district court relied did 
impact Mitchell's substantial rights and would not have been admissible at trial, this Court 
should hold that the district court erred in admitting and relying on such evidence. 
B. The State has Failed to Present a Meritorious Argument that the District Court 
Correctly Refused to Allow a Private Right of Action to Enforce Mitchell's Rights as 
a Crime Victim. 
The State offers three arguments in support of the district court's decision that there is no 
private right of action pursuant to which a victim may enforce the rights guaranteed by 
Article 1, § 22 of the Idaho State Constitution and codified by the legislature in Idaho 
Code§ 19-5306(4). None of the three arguments have merit. Because none of the State's 
statutory interpretation arguments have merit, the State further argued that its involvement in 
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Mitchell's guardianship proceedings were not the type of actions contemplated by Idaho's 
victims' rights laws and, therefore, Mitchell was not entitled to notice, anyway. Because the 
State failed to develop this argument in the proceedings before the district court, it cannot be 
considered by this Court for the first time on appeal. 
i. The prohibition against costs in the victims' rights laws mean only that costs 
cannot be awarded; they do not mean that no private rights of action exist. 
The State's first argument in support of the district court's decision is that the permissive 
costs that are available in a declaratory judgment action and the mandatory costs available in a 
civil action bring a private litigant's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief within the 
prohibitions of Article 1, § 22 and§ 19-5306(4). Resp. Br. 15-16. The State cites no legal 
authority supporting this strained interpretation of the prohibition. Id 
Contrary to the State's unsupported contention, this Court has previously held that where 
a statute contains language regarding the recovery of costs and/or fees that differs from the 
language contained in this state's rules of civil procedure, the statutory authority controls. See 
Idaho Department of Health v. Southfork Lumber Co., 123 Idaho 146, 149, 845 P.2d 564, 567 
(1993) (holding that where the statute provides for recovery of more costs than are allowed by 
the rules of civil procedure, the statute controls); see also Perkins v. US. Transformer W, 132 
Idaho 427,431, 974 P.2d 73, 77 (1999) ("Without specific language to the contrary in the statute, 
our rules of civil procedure provide the correct basis by which to measure an award of costs in 
such an action.") (overruled on other grounds). Indeed, in In re. Univ. Place/Idaho Water Ctr. 
Project, this Court affirmed an award of costs granted under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 
holding that such award obviated the need to address the requirements for awarding costs under 
Idaho's rules of civil procedure. 146 Idaho 527, 546, 199 P.3d 102, 121 (2008). The victims' 
rights provisions, in both the code and the constitution, specifically state that costs may not be 
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awarded, and the Declaratory Judgment Act provides that costs are permissive, not mandatory. 
Because none of the authority upon which Mitchell relies mandates an award of costs, Mitchell's 
requests for declaratory and injunctive relief do not run afoul of the prohibitions contained in 
either the constitutional or statutory versions of the victims' rights laws. 
ii. When a constitutional provision expressly states that it is self-enacting, it is. 
The State's second argument in support of the district court's decision is that the victims' 
rights provisions are not self-enacting. In support of this position, the State argues that there is 
"little functional difference" between the victims' rights provisions of Idaho and Nebraska and 
notes that "a constitutional provision may be expressed in mandatory terms and still not be self-
executing." Resp. Br. at 1 7. A prime example of a constitutional provision that is expressed in 
mandatory terms that is not self-executing is the Nebraska provision. That law expressly 
provides "[t]he legislature shall provide by law for the implementation of the rights granted in 
this section." State ex. Rel. Lamm v. Nebraska Bd. Of Pardons, 260 Neb. 1000, 1005, 620 
N.W.2d 763, 768 (2001) (emphasis added). 
The Nebraska language stands in stark contrast to the language in Idaho's constitution. 
First the Idaho constitution provides that "This section shall be self-enacting." Idaho Const., 
Article I, § 22. The Idaho constitution then allows, but does not require, the legislature to take 
further action if it elects to do so: "The legislature shall have the power to enact laws to define, 
implement, preserve, and expand the rights guaranteed to victims in the provisions of this 
section." Id. The reason the Idaho constitution permits but does not mandate the legislature to 
take further action is because the statue is, indeed, self-enacting. There is nothing more that the 
legislature needs to do in order for the constitutional guarantees to take effect. Contrary to the 
State's argument that there is little functional difference between the Idaho and Nebraska 
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prov1s10ns, when companng the two prov1s10ns it 1s evident that they are fundamentally 
different. 
iii. The State's proposed interpretation of Idaho's victims' rights laws ignores 
traditional canons of statutory construction. 
The final argument that the State makes in support of the district court's decision is that it 
is improper for Mitchell to interpret the absence of any express reference to declaratory or 
equitable relief to mean that such relief is available. The State argues that if the legislature had 
intended to allow certain enforcement mechanisms, it was required to do so expressly. This 
argument is not supported by any interpretive authority and is simply wrong for two reasons. 
First, neither the constitution nor statutory guarantees of victims' rights expressly prohibit 
declaratory or injunctive actions for enforcement. Indeed, one would argue that such actions are 
intentionally allowed by the language of both provisions stating: 
Nothing in this section shall be construed ... as limiting any rights 
for victims previously conferred by statute. 
Idaho Const. Article I, § 22; Idaho Code § 19-5309( 4). Since 1933, the Idaho Code has provided 
for declaratory actions in Idaho Code § 10-1201, 4 which states: 
Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have 
power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or 
not further relief is or could be claimed. No action or proceeding 
shall be open to objection on the ground that a declaratory 
judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration may be either 
affirmative or negative in form and effect, and such declarations 
shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree. 
Idaho Code § 10-1202 further declares that "[a]ny person ... whose rights, status or other legal 
relations are affected by a statute . . . may have determined any question of construction or 
validity arising under the ... statute ... and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal 
relations thereunder." And, Idaho Code § 10-1205 explains that the enumerated authorities of 
4 Idaho Code, Section 10-1201 was adopted by S.L. 1933, Ch. 70 § 1. 
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section 10-1202 "does not limit or restrict the exercise of the general powers conferred in section 
10-1201,"-that is, those to whom a statute or constitutional right applies have historically had 
the right to seek declaratory relief. See Greer v. Lewiston Golf & Country Club, Inc., 81 Idaho 
393, 342 P.2d 719 (1959), Idaho Schools for Equal Educational Opportuinty v. Idaho State Bd. 
Of Educ., 128 Idaho 276, 912 P.2d 694 (1996). There is nothing in the victims' rights laws that 
expressly preclude declaratory relief. 
Second, the State's strained interpretation directly contradicts the maxim of expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius-meaning that the inclusion of certain enumerated items necessarily 
means the exclusion of the items not listed. See, e.g., State v. Michael, 111 Idaho 930, 933, 729 
P.2d 405, 408 (1986). Indeed, under the State's interpretation of the statutory and constitutional 
provisions, there is no enforcement mechanism pursuant to which a victim can ensure that his 
rights are protected. If the legislature had intended for there to be no enforcement mechanisms at 
all, it could have simply stated that there would be no enforcement mechanisms at all. It did not. 
Both the constitutional and statutory provisions specifically excluded certain enumerated 
enforcement mechanisms but leave unaltered and unimpaired the historic rights of persons whose 
rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by these laws to seek declaratory and equitable 
relief. Consistent with the maxim expresio unius exclusion alterius, this Court should interpret 
the limitations of the law narrowly, to prohibit only those actions that are expressly prohibited 
but preserving the right of victims to pursue enforcement actions that are not expressly 
disallowed: i.e., actions for declaratory or injunctive relief. 
iv. The State did not move for summary judgment on the grounds that Mitchell 
is not entitled to notice involving Simpson's guardianship proceedings and 
such argument cannot be considered for the first time on appeal. 
Finally, in an effort to have this Court affirm the district court's rulings on grounds other 
than those relied upon by the district court, the State argues that its failure to provide notice of 
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Simpson's guardianship proceedings did not violate Mitchell's rights as a crime victim. Similar 
to its argument that Mitchell failed to present evidence of the State's lack of due care m 
implementing the Traughber Memorandum's directives in Simpson's specific case, this issue 
was never raised with the district court and, therefore, cannot be considered for the first time on 
appeal. 
In its motion to the district court, the State raised only the argument that there is no 
private right of action under Idaho's victims' rights laws. R. 93-94. Mitchell defended that 
portion of the motion on the grounds raised. R. 143-45. In its summary judgment reply brief, 
the State made a passing reference to the present argument that the victims' rights provisions do 
not entitle Mitchell to notice of the guardianship proceedings initiated by the State. R. 272-73. 
However, this passing reference is too little, too late to preserve the argument for appeal. See 
Nycum, 109 Idaho at 862, 712 P.2d at 563 (citing International Business Machines Corp. v. 
Lawhorn, 106 Idaho 194, 677 P.2d 507 (Ct. App. 1984) for the proposition that an issue must be 
supported by a factual showing or by submission of legal authority in order to preserve the issue 
for appeal). 
Even if the State had properly preserved this issue for appeal, it would still be appropriate 
for this Court to reverse the district court's decision based on the evidence in the record. In the 
present case the State admits that it did not notify Mitchell that it had initiated the guardianship 
proceeding on behalf of Simpson, nor was he informed of anything pertaining to the purpose of 
that proceeding. R. 214, 327, 328. The State has never disputed the fact that the purpose of the 
guardianship proceeding was to allow for the "release" of Simpson from custody at State 
Hospital South. It also does not dispute that the effect of that release was to effect the dismissal 
of the criminal charges against Simpson. R. 198-199, 200. The gravamen of Mitchell's claims 
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under the victims' rights laws can be simply stated. The State's activities with respect to 
were so Simpson's criminal 
proceedings that Mitchell, as the victim of a crime committed by Simpson, was entitled to be 
informed of those proceedings so that he could meaningfully exercise his rights as the victim of 
Simpson's crime. That is precisely the type of relief that should be available to Mitchell under 
Idaho's declaratory relief act, which allows "[a]ny person ... whose rights, status or other legal 
relations are affected by a statute . . . may have determined any question of construction or 
validity arising under the ... statute ... and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal 
relations thereunder." Idaho Code § 10-1202. This is precisely the type of case that 1s 
appropriate for decision under Idaho's declaratory relief act. 
This said, Mitchell's main point should not be lost. The State did not develop this 
guardianship issue on its motion before the district court. Accordingly, this Court should refuse 
the State's request to consider the matter for the first time on appeal. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the forgoing reasons, those which are argued in the opening brief and those that may 
appear at oral argument, Mitchell respectfully requests that this Court enter an order reversing 
the decision of the district court and remanding the matter for trial. 
Dated this 5th day of December, 2014. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
MAUK MILLER & BURGOYNE FISHER RAINEY HUDSON 
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